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ARGUMENT
It was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment to Byer because there
are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether there was an employer-employee
relationship between Byer and Miles and whether Miles was acting in the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident.
I.

When the Facts are Considered in the Light Most Favorable to Sutton,
Reasonable Minds Could Differ Regarding Whether An Employer-Employee
Relationship Existed Between Miles and Byer.
Byer argues that no respondeat superior relationship existed between Byer and Miles.

However, the standard set out in Glover by & through Mary Dyson v. BSA, 923 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1996), is not whether a respondeat superior relationship exists, but whether an
employer-employee relationship exists. See Id. at 1385. Whether an employer-employee
relationship exists is determined by whether the alleged employer had the right to control the
employee. See Id, at 1385. In Glover the Utah Supreme Court developed factors to help
determine whether the employer had the right to control the employee. These include: (1)
whatever covenants or agreements exist concerning the right of direction and control over
the employee; (2) the right to hire and fire; (3) the method of payment (i.e., wages vs.
payment for a completed job or project); and (4) the furnishing of equipment See id. at
1385-86. The Court may also consider intent of the parties and the business of the employer
in addition to compensation, direction, and control. Id. at 1386. However, no single factor
is completely controlling. Id.
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In the case at hand, the above factors are clearly in favor of an employer-employee
relationship existing between Byer and Miles. Miles was an employee of Byer. Byer most
certainly had the right to hire and fire Miles. Miles was paid hourly by Byer. (See R. 590.)
Byer hired Miles to operate a trackhoe and supplied the trackhoe for Miles' use. (See R
669.) The nature of Byer's business clearly shows that Byer had the right to control Miles.
Miles and Byer had an employee-employer relationship, or at the very least, reasonable
minds could differ regarding such. Therefore, summary judgment was improper.
Byer argues that it cannot be held liable for Miles acts because at the time of the
accident Miles' employer was Lowell Construction. This simply is not so. Miles was
assisting Lowell Construction, however, there was no employer-employee relationship
between Lowell Construction and Miles. Neither Lowell Construction nor Sutton was a
special temporary employer of Miles. The special temporary employer test requires: (1) the
employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with the special employer; (2) the
work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and (3) the special employer has
the right to control the details of the work. Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries, 921 P.2d 456,
459 (Utah 1996).
There is no evidence that Lowell Construction and Sutton ever made any contract for
hire for Miles. There is no evidence that anyone other than Byer, had the right to control
Miles. There is no evidence that Miles could not have refused to assist Lowell Construction
or Sutton. Byer and its employee Miles controlled and had the right to control the trackhoe.
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(See R. 669). Accordingly, there is no special temporary employer status in this matter.
Therefore, summary judgment was improper.
II.

When the Facts are Considered in the Light Most Favorable to Sutton,
Reasonable Minds Could Differ Regarding Whether Miles Was Acting Within
the Scope of His Employment at the Time of the Accident.

Utah law is well established that the employment status of an individual is normally a fact
question to be determined by a jury. The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
Whether an employee is acting within the scope of [his] employment is
ordinarily a question of fact. The question must be submitted to the jury
whenever reasonable minds may differ as to whether the [employee] was at a
certain time involved wholly or partially in the performance of [the
employer's] business or within the scope of employment.
Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted).
Byer presents certain facts arguably supporting its position that Miles was not acting within
the scope of his employment.
A three-part test set forth in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989),
must be used in determining whether Miles was acting withing the scope of his employment
at the time of the accident. However, in applying each prong of the Birkner test Byer seeks
to create a higher standard than was established in Birkner. The three prongs of the Birkner
test will be addressed below.
A.

Miles' work in operating the trackhoe to unload the rebar was the
general kind of work he was employed to perform.

With respect to the first prong of the Birkner test, Byer states that the standard is that
"the employee must be about the employer's business and the duties assigned by the
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employer". Brief of Appellee at p. 23. However, the standard set forth in Birkner is
significantly broader. #/r£ft<?r established the first prong as follows:
First, an employee's conduct must be of the general kind the employee is
employed to perform. That means that an employee's acts or conduct must be
generally directed toward the accomplishment of objectives within the scope
of the employee's duties and authority, or reasonably incidental thereto. In
other words, the employee must be about the employer's business and the
duties assigned by the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in a
personal endeavor.
Birkner, at 1056-57 (emphasis added).
Byer incorrectly argues that Miles scope of employment, (1) was determined by tasks and
objectives assigned by Byer, (2) was not determined by what other Byer employees were
hired to perform, (3) did not include taking direction from Sutton, and (4) was not determined
by a barter system. Brief of Appellee at pp. 25-30. However, pursuant to Birkner, the
question is simply whether he was engaging in conduct of the general kind he was hired to
perform and not wholly involved in a personal endeavor. This is a "factual question to be
decided by the trier of fact." Birkner at 1057.
Contrary to Byer's argument, there is no requirement that Miles was fulfilling a
specific assignment of Byer. Neither is there a prohibition on the finder of fact considering
possible uses of the equipment, other Byer employees' actions, instructions given from Sutton
to Miles, or the barter system and custom, in determining whether Miles' conduct was of the
general kind he was employed to perform. When considered in the light most favorable to
Sutton, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the work performed in operating the
trackhoe at the request of Sutton was of the general kind Miles was employed to perform.
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Miles was employed by Byer to operate its trackhoe, which he regularly did at the request of
Sutton. At the time of the accident Miles was operating Byer's trackhoe at the request of
Sutton. (See R. 674.)
There is no evidence that Miles was engaged wholly in a personal endeavor. Miles
specifically stated that he did not want to help. (See R. 670.) He was asked by Sutton to
operate the trackhoe to unload the rebar. (See R. 674.) He was using a trackhoe owned by
Byer. (See R. 669.) In a recorded statement Miles gave to an investigator in April of 2008,
Miles says he worked for Byer and he says nothing about the offloading of rebar being done
on his own. (See R. 662.)
B.

Miles' conduct occurred within the hours of Miles' work and the ordinary
spatial boundaries of his employment.

Byer concedes the accident happened within the regular hours of Miles' work day.
(See R. 576.) Byer seems to suggest, however, without any support, that an employee is not
acting within the hours of his work if he does not turn-in time for that work. The rule is not
so restrictive. Swenson requires only that the conduct "occur[s] substantially within the
hours... of the employment." Swenson at 127. Swenson goes on to say that some flexibility
is required. Id. at 128 fn 1. The accident occurred within Miles' normal work day.
Therefore, summary judgment was improper.
Byer seems to argue that the spatial boundary is very strict. However, the standard in
Swenson is simply that the "conduct must occur substantially within the...spatial boundaries
of the employment." Id. at 127 (emphasis added). Several times Byer incorrectly states that
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the trackhoe left Lot 174. See Brief of Appellee at pp. 5-6. However, the record clearly
shows that Miles and the trackhoe never left Lot 174. {See R. 698-699.) At his deposition,
Don Jones, who was present on the day of the accident drew a diagram depicting the location
of the trackhoe at the time of the accident. (See R. 700.) The diagram depicts the trackhoe
squarely within Lot 174. (See Id.) Additionally, Mr. Jones testified as follows:
Q
And he left lot 174?
A.
No. He remained on the lot.
Q.
He remained on lot 174?
A.
Correct.
®. 604.)
Certainly Miles was substantially within the boundaries of his employment, given that
he never left the lot where he was performing his excavation work. At the very least,
reasonable minds could differ as to whether staying on Lot 174, with the boom extending to
Lot 173, is substantially within the spatial boundaries of Miles' employment. Therefore,
summary judgment was improper.
C.

Miles5 conduct was motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving
Byer's interest.

The third prong of the Birkner test states that "the employee's conduct must be
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest." Birkner, at
1057 (emphasis added). Byer seems to argue that Miles was acting outside the scope of his
employment because he was not primarily motived by a desire to benefit Byer and his work
did not ultimately benefit Byer. The standard is much lower than Byer suggests. First, Miles
only had to be motivated, in part, by a desire to serve Byer's interest; such desire did not have
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to be the primary motivation. Second, even though Byer did benefit from Miles' work,
actually producing a benefit to the employer is not required under Birkner. All that is
required is whether the employee was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve his
employer.
When the facts are considered in the light most favorable to Sutton, reasonable minds
could differ regarding whether Miles was motived, in part, by a desire to serve Byer. Miles
testified that he personally did not want to help unload the rebar (See R. 670.) Miles had been
asked to help other contractors in the past (See R. 674.) At the time of the accident, Miles
was at work, for Byer, and he was responding to the request of Sutton; someone he answered
to on other jobs for Byer. (See R. 669.) It seems clear that Miles thought unloading the rebar
was something he should do as part of his work for Byer. Otherwise he would not have done
it because, as he testified, he did not want to help. (See R. 670.) Certainly assisting in the
unloading maintained a good rapport for Byer. When these facts are considered in the light
most favorable to Sutton, a juror could conclude that Miles was motived, at least in part, by
a desire to serve Byer.
III.

When the Facts are Considered in the Light Most Favorable to Sutton,
Reasonable Minds Could Differ Regarding Whether Miles Operated Under the
Apparent Authority of Byer.
Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Byer cloaked Miles with authority

to offload the rebar by, (1) Byer providing Miles with the exclusive use of the trackhoe, (2)
giving Miles authority regarding how to use the trackhoe, and (3) conducting itself in such
a manner that Miles believed he had authority to exercise his independent judgment as to
-8-
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whether or not he could make the decision to help in unloading the rebar. (See R. 669-671.)
Because reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Byer cloaked Miles with authority,
the trial court's grant of summary judgment must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant EJ. Sutton requests a reversal of the Order on
Summary Judgment. When the facts are considered in the light most favorable to Appellant,
reasonable minds could differ regarding whether, (1) Byer and Miles had an EmployerEmployee relationship, (2) Miles was acting within the scope of his employment for Byer at
the time of the accident, and (3) Miles had apparent authority from Byer at the time of the
accident. When the facts are considered in the light most favorable to Sutton, genuine issues
of material fact exist and the trial court erred in granting Byer's motion for summary
judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of May, 2011.
SCALLEY READING BATES
HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C.

John Edward Hansen
mathan H. Rupp
/Attorneys for Appellant
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